We study optimized monetary and …scal feedback policy rules. The setup is a New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy which is solved numerically using common parameter values and …scal data from the euro area. Our aim is to welfare rank alternative tax-spending policy instruments used for shock stabilization and debt consolidation when, at the same time, the monetary authorities can follow a Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate.
Introduction
Policymakers use their instruments to react to economic conditions. For instance, central banks may respond to in ‡ation, the …scal authorities to the state of public …nances, and both of them to real economic activity. It is nevertheless believed that the use of …scal policy is more complex and controversial than the use of monetary policy (see e.g. Leeper, 2010) . The debate over the use of …scal policy has been intensi…ed since 2009 when most European governments embarked on the di¢ cult task of reducing their public debts at a time of stagnant or negative growth. 1 What is the best policy reaction to economic conditions within this environment?
In this paper, we search for the best mix of monetary and …scal policy actions in a closed economy, when the policy role is twofold: to stabilize the economy against shocks and to improve resource allocation by gradually reducing the public debt burden over time. In order to do so, we welfare rank various …scal policy instruments used jointly with nominal interest rate policy.
Following most of the related literature (see below), we work with feedback policy rules.
In particular, we specify feedback rules for public spending, the tax rate on labor income, the tax rate on capital income and the tax rate on consumption, when these …scal policy instruments are allowed to respond to a number of macroeconomic variables used as indicators, while, at the same time, monetary policy can be used in a standard Taylor-type fashion. We optimally choose the magnitude of feedback policy reaction to those indicators. The welfare criterion is household's expected discounted lifetime utility. This type of policy is known as "optimized" feeback policy rules (see Uribe, 2005, 2007 , and many others). This enables us to welfare rank alternative policies in a stochastic setup, without our results -and, in particular, our welfare ranking of alternative policies -being driven by ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients, as it happens in most of the related literature on debt consolidation (see below). We compare two policy environments. In the …rst, used as a benchmark, the authorities just stabilize the economy from exogenous shocks. In the second, the …scal authorities also aim at reducing the ratio of public debt to output gradually over time, which means that now we combine shock stabilization with resource allocation policies.
The setup is a rather standard New Keynesian DSGE model of a closed economy featuring 1 Even in normal times, …scal imbalances can jeopardize the stability of the whole euro area. Hence the arguments for the restrictions of the Stability and Growth Pact. After the global …nancial crisis of 2007 and the sharp deterioration of public …nances (in the euro area, the ratio of public debt to output was around 69% in 2008 and increased to around 95% in 2013), in view of growing concerns about …scal sustainability, many countries have been forced to initiate substantial …scal adjustments. However, the resulting spending cuts, and in particular the reliance on tax revenue measures, are believed to cause a signi…cant burden on real activity. See e.g. European Commission (2013) and CESifo (2014).
imperfect competition, Calvo-type price …xities and wage rigidities. The model is solved numerically employing commonly used parameter values and …scal data from the euro area. The steady state solution of this model (called the status quo) serves as a point of departure to study the implications of various policies aiming at shock stabilization and debt consolidation.
To solve for optimized policy rules, we adopt the methodology of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004, 2007) , in the sense that we take a second-order approximation to both the equilbrium conditions and the welfare criterion and, in turn, we compute the welfare-maximizing values of feedback policy rules, and the associated social welfare, under various policy scenaria.
Our main results are as follows. First, in all cases studied, the monetary authorities should aggressively react to in ‡ation and the …scal authorities should react to public debt. Also, in all cases studied, interest rate reaction to the output gap should be smaller in magnitude than reaction to in ‡ation (this happens even if the policy target for output is the so-called natural level of output). In other words, the main concern of monetary authorities should be in ‡ation stability rather than the real economy. On the other hand, the degree of …scal reaction to the output gap (the so-called …scal activism) relative to reaction to public debt, and hence what should be the main concern of …scal authorities, depends crucially on the distorting e¤ects of each …scal instrument used and the degree of rigidities in the labor market. The more distorting a …scal policy instrument is, the less it should be used for debt consolidation and the more it should be used to support the real economy. This applies in particular to labor taxes all the time and to capital taxes in the medium and long term. Rigidities in the labor market provide further arguments for …scal activism. All this means that, under optimized rules, the …nal, or net, change in …scal policy instruments is determined by the reconciliation of two typically opposing aims: to reduce public debt and to stimulate the economy. The …nal, or net, e¤ect is a quantitative matter (see our fourth result below).
Second, when we focus on lifetime utility only, welfare di¤erences between debt consolidation and no debt consolidation look to be small. However, this happens only because short-term e¤ects work in opposite direction from medium-and long-term e¤ects, so that the net, or lifetime, e¤ects are small. In particular, the comparison of outcomes with consolidation to outcomes without consolidation implies that, in most cases, consolidation is costly in the short run and that these costs are not trivial. By contrast, in the medium-and long-term, debt consolidation becomes superior across all cases and this more than o¤sets its short-term costs, so that eventually lifetime, or net, utility is higher with debt consolidation.
Third, in the case of debt consolidation, the choice of …scal policy instrument matters for how quickly public debt should be brought down. For instance, in our baseline experiments, public debt reduction from 85%, which is its average value in the recent euro area data, to the 60% target level, which is the reference level of the Maastricht Treaty, should be achieved within 5 to 12.5 years depending on how distorting the …scal instrument is (5 years if we use public spending or consumption taxes, and 12.5 years if we use capital taxes). This pace should be slower if there are labor market rigidities since, in the presence of such rigidities, …scal policy should be mainly concerned about the real economy. On the other hand, if we use labor taxes, which are a particularly distorting instrument at any time, the pace of public debt reduction should be very slow, following an almost unit root process, and this is irrespectively of the degree of labour market rigidities.
Fourth, the choice of …scal policy instrument matters for welfare too. If there are no rigidities in the labor market, the concern for public debt should dominate the concern for output and, in this case, it is better to use public spending along with interest rate policy.
Practically, this means that, if there are no labor market rigidities, the best …scal policy action is to cut public spending initially so as to bring public debt down. On the other hand, if there are rigidities in the labor market, the concern for output should dominate the concern for public debt and, in this case, it is better to use income (labor or capital) taxes on the side of …scal policy. Practically, this means that, if there are labor market rigidities, the best …scal policy action is to cut labor and capital taxes initially so as to stimulate the real economy and only in turn raise them to bring public debt down gradually over time. 2 How does our work di¤er? Although there has been a rich literature on the interaction between …scal and monetary policy, 3 as well as on public debt consolidation, 4 there has not been a welfare comparison of the main tax-spending policy instruments in a uni…ed framework of a closed economy, and how this comparison depends on policy goals (shock stabilization only, or shock stabilization plus debt consolidation) as well as on the presence of labor market rigidities. Also, as said above, our results are based on optimized policy rules.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 presents the data, parameter values and the steady state solution. Section 4 explains how we work. The main results are in Sections 5 and 6. Robustness checks are in Section 7. Section 8 closes the paper. Details are in an Appendix. 2 These results should be contrasted to those in an open economy facing sovereign risk premia and a non-zero probability of default, where …scal policy instruments should be earmarked to debt consolidation almost in all cases (see Philippopoulos et al., 2013) . 3 See e.g. Leeper (1991) 
Model
The model is a standard New Keynesian model featuring imperfect competition and Calvotype nominal rigidities, which is extended to include a relatively rich menu of state-contingent policy rules.
Households
There are i = 1; 2; :::; :N identical households. Households act competitively. The objective of each i is to maximize expected discounted lifetime utility:
where c i;t is i's consumption bundle (de…ned below), n i;t is i's hours of work, m i;t is i's real money balances, g t is per capita public spending, 0 < < 1 is the time preference rate and E 0 is the rational expectations operator.
In our numerical solutions, we use a utility function of the form (see also e.g. Gali, 2008):
where n ; m ; g ; , , ; are standard preference parameters.
The budget constraint of each household i (written in real terms) is:
where P t is the price index and small letters denote real variables, e.g. Pt . Here, x i;t is i's real investment at t, B i;t is i's end-ofperiod nominal government bonds, M i;t is i's end-of period nominal money holdings, r k t is the real return to inherited capital k i;t 1 , D i;t is i's nominal dividends paid by …rms, W t is the nominal wage rate, R t 1 1 is the gross nominal return to government bonds between t 1 and t, l i;t is real lump-sum taxes/transfers made to each i from the government, and 0 c t ; k t ; n t < 1 are respectively the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labour income. The motion of physical capital for each household i is:
where 0 < < 1 is the depreciation rate of capital.
The quantity of each variety h, produced monopolistically by …rm h, and consumed by household i, is denoted as c i;t (h). The composite of goods consumed by household i is given by: 5
where > 0 is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced and
= 1 are weights (to avoid scale e¤ects, we set = 1=N in equilibrium). Household i's total consumption expenditure is:
where P t (h) is the price of variety h.
Details of the above problem and its solution are in Appendix 1.
Firms
There are h = 1; 2; :::; :N …rms. Each …rm h produces a di¤erentiated good of variety h under monopolistic competition facing Calvo-type nominal …xities. The nominal pro…t of …rm h is de…ned as:
All …rms use the same technology represented by the production function:
where A t is an exogenous stochastic TFP process whose motion is de…ned below.
Pro…t maximization by …rm h is also subject to the demand for its product (see Appendix 2 for details):
5 As in e.g. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2003) , we work with summations rather than with integrals.
which says that demand for …rm h 0 s product, y t (h), comes from households' consumption and investment, c t (h) and x t (h), where c t (h)
In addition, following Calvo (1983), …rms choose their prices facing a nominal …xity. In each period, …rm h faces an exogenous probability of not being able to reset its price. A …rm h, which is able to reset its price, chooses its price P # t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted expected nominal pro…ts for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price …xed. This objective is given by:
where t;t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the …rm, y t+k (h) =
y t+k and Details of the above problem and its solution are in Appendix 2.
Government budget constraint
The budget constraint of the consolidated government sector expressed in real terms and aggregate quantities is:
where b t is the end-of-period total stock of real public debt and m t is the end-of-period total stock of real money balances. Note that
T l i;t , and all other variables have been de…ned above. As above, small letters denote real variables.
In each period, one of the …scal policy instruments c t , k t , n t , g t ; l t , b t has to follow residually to satisfy the government budget constraint (see below).
Decentralized equilibrium (given policy)
We now combine all the above to solve for a Decentralized Equilibrium (DE) for any feasible monetary and …scal policy. The DE is de…ned to be a sequence of allocations, prices and policies such that: (i) all households maximize utility; (ii) a fraction (1 ) of …rms maximize pro…ts by choosing an identical price P # t ; while the rest, , set their previous period prices; (iii) all constraints, including the government budget constraint, are satis…ed; (iv) all markets clear.
To proceed with the solution, we need to de…ne the policy regime. Regarding monetary policy, we assume, as is usually the case, that the nominal interest rate, R t , is used as a policy instrument, while money balances are endogenously detemined. Regarding …scal policy, we assume that, in the transition, tax rates and public spending, c t , k t ; n t ; g t ; l t , are set exogenously, while the end-of-period public debt, b t , follows residually from the government budget constraint (see Section 4 below for a discussion of public …nancing cases).
Appendix 3 presents the dynamic DE system. It consists of 14 equations in 14 variables fy t ; c t ; n t ; x t ; k t ; m t ; b t ; P t ; P # t ; e P t ; w t ; mc t ; d t ; r k t g 1 t=0 . This is given the independently set policy instruments, fR t ; c t , k t ; n t ; g t ; l t g 1 t=0 , technology fA t g 1 t=0 , and initial conditions for the state variables. All these variables have been de…ned above, except from e P t and mc t , where
and mc t is the …rm's marginal cost as de…ned in Appendix 2.
Before we specify the processes of policy instruments and exogenous variables in the next two subsections, and by following the related literature, we transform the above equilibrium conditions. In particular, we express price levels in in ‡ation rates, rewrite the …rm's optimality condition in recursive form and introduce a new equation that helps us to compute household's expected discounted lifetime utility. Appendix 4 presents details and the resulting transformed DE system consisting of 17 equations in 17 variables.
Policy rules
Following the related literature, we focus on simple rules for the exogenously set policy instruments, which means that the monetary and …scal authorities react to a small number of macroeconomic indicators. In particular, we allow the nominal interest rate, R t ; to follow a standard Taylor rule, meaning that it can react to in ‡ation and output as deviations from a policy target, while we allow the distorting …scal policy instruments, namely, government spending as a share of output, s g t gt yt , and the tax rates on consumption, capital income and labor income, c t ; k t and n t , to react to public debt and output, again as deviations from a policy target. The target values are de…ned below.
In particular, following e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007), we use policy rules of the functional form:
where variables without time subscripts denote target values, and , y , q l , q y 0, for q (g; c; k; n), are feedback policy coe¢ cients, and where:
denotes the beginning-of-period public debt burden as share of GDP.
Exogenous stochastic variables
We now de…ne the processes of exogenous stochastic variables. For notational simplicity, we include shocks to TFP only (as we report below, the main results do not change if we add other shocks). In particular, we assume that the TFP follows an AR(1) process: 2.7 Final equilibrium system (given feedback policy coe¢ cients)
The …nal equilibrium system consists of the 17 equations of the transformed DE presented at the end of Appendix 4, and the 5 feedback policy rules as well as the de…nition of l t presented in subsection 2.5. We thus end up with 23 equations in 23 variables fy t ; c t ; n t ; x t ; k t ; m t ; b t ;
To solve this non-linear di¤erence equation system, we take a second-order approximation around steady state. We will work as follows. We …rst solve the model numerically employing common parameter values and data from the euro area. The next section (Section 3) presents the steady state solution of this economy, or what we call the status quo. In turn, the next sections will study the optimal choice of feedback policy coe¢ cients, and the resulting transition dynamics, under various policy scenaria when we depart from this status quo.
3 Data, parameterization and steady state
As said above, this section solves numerically for the steady state of the above model economy by using conventional parameter values and data from the euro area. In steady state, the gross in ‡ation rate is set at one meaning zero price in ‡ation (see Section 7 below for other cases). Also, since policy instruments react to deviations of macroeconomic indicators from their long-run values, feedback policy coe¢ cients play no role in steady state.
Data and parameterization
The …scal data are from OECD Economic Outlook no. 89. The time unit is meant to be a quarter. Our baseline parameter values are summarized in Table 1 (see Section 7 below for other parameter values and various robustness checks).
Using the Euler equation for bonds, the value of time preference rate, , follows so as to be consistent with the average value of the real interest rate in the data, 0.0075 quarterly or 0.03
annualy. The real money balances elasticity, , is taken from Pappa and Neiss (2005) , who estimate this value using UK data; this implies an interest-rate semi elasticity of money demand equal to -0.29 which is a common value in this literature. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution, , the inverse of Frisch labour elasticity, , and the price elasticity of demand,
, are set as in Andrès and Doménech (2006) and Galí (2008) in related studies. Regarding preference parameters in the utility function, m is chosen so as to obtain a value of real money balances as share of output equal to 1:97 quarterly, or 0:49 annually, which is close to the data (when we use the M 1 measure, the average value in the annual data is around 0:5), n is chosen so as to obtain steady-state labour hours equal to 0:28; while g is arbitrarily set at 0:1 which is a common valuation of public goods in related utility functions. Other parameters, like measuring Calvo-type nominal …xities, are also set as in related studies of the euro area (see e.g. Galí et al., 2001 ). As reported below in Section 7, our results are robust to changes in parameter values.
Concerning the exogenous stochastic variables, we start by setting A = 0:8 and A = 0:017 for the persistence parameter and the standard deviation respectively of TFP in equation (18) (the value of A is similar to that in Andrès and Domenéch, 2006 , while the value of a is close to that in Bi, 2010, and Bi and Kumhof, 2009).
The steady state values of the exogenously set policy instruments are either set at their data averages, or are calibrated to deliver data-consistent long-run values for the endogenous variables. In particular, c ; k ; n are the averages of the e¤ective tax rates in the data.
Lump-sum taxes, s l , follow residually in the long run, when total public spending as share of output, s l + s g , is set at 0.43 and when the public debt-to-output ratio is set at 3:4 quarterly (or 0:85 annually), which are the values in the average data over 2008-2011. 
How we model policy
In this section, we explain the policy experiments we focus on (subsection 4.1), the motivation for debt consolidation (subsection 4.2), how we model debt consolidation (subsection 4.3) and how we compute optimized feedback policy rules (subsection 4.4). Recall that, along the transition path, nominal rigidities imply that money is not neutral so that interest rate policy matter to the real economy. Also, recall that, along the transition path, di¤erent countercyclical policy rules, and hence di¤erent values of feedback policy coe¢ cients, can have di¤erent implications.
Types of policy action
We will study two environments regarding policy action. In the …rst, used as a benchmark, the role of policy is only to stabilize the economy against temporary shocks. For instance, an adverse temporary TFP shock, as de…ned in equation (18) above, produces a contraction in output and a rise in the public debt to output ratio. Then, the policy questions are which policy instrument to use, and how strong the reaction of policy instruments to deviations from targets should be, when these targets are given by the status quo long-run solution. Technically speaking, in this case, we depart from, and end up, at the same steady state, which is the status quo in subsection 3.2 above, while transition dynamics are driven by temporary shocks only.
The second environment is richer. Now the role of policy is twofold: to stabilize the economy against the same shocks as above and, at the same time, to improve resource allocation by gradually reducing the public debt ratio over time. The policy questions are as above except that now the policy targets are given by the long-run solution of the reformed economy.
Technically speaking, in this case, we depart from the status quo solution, but we end up at a new reformed long-run with lower public debt. Thus, now there are two sources of transition dynamics: temporary shocks and the di¤erence between the initial and the new reformed steady state.
Is public debt bad?
Before we study the implications of di¤erent debt consolidation strategies, it is natural to ask "Is public debt bad?". Although it is widely recognized that we lack a theory of the optimal level of public debt, it is also well documented that a "high" level of public debt hurts the macroeconomy (see e.g. Wren-Lewis, 2010, for a review of the literature). Since the study of such issues is beyond the scope of the current paper, here we just report that, in our DSGE New Keynesian model, a public debt lower than in the recent average data (85% of GDP) is bene…cial to the economy and this happens mainly through two channels. First, focusing on the steady state, a lower public debt creates …scal space and this can be used, for instance, to cut distorting taxes (see subsection 4.3 below for public …nancing details). Second, focusing on the transition, our simulations show that, if we arbitrarily assume that the economy is subject to an initial debt shock (see also Cantore et al., 2012) , this leads to a fall in output (this happens irrespectively of the …scal instrument used to react to the public debt gap) and a fall in private investment (this happens when we use income taxes to react to the public debt gap). Results and details are available upon request from the authors.
This can justify the study of di¤erent debt consolidation strategies below.
How we model debt consolidation
We assume that the government aims to reduce the share of public debt from 85% (which was the average value in the data over 2008-2011 and was also our status quo solution above)
to the target value of 60%. We choose the target value of 60% simply because it has been the reference rate of the Maastricht Treaty (we report however that our main results are not sensitive to the value of the debt target assumed). Obviously, debt reductions have to be accommodated by adjustments in the tax-spending policy instruments, which, in our model, are the output share of public spending, and the tax rates on capital income, labour income and consumption.
It is widely recognized that the implications of debt consolidation depend heavily on the public …nancing policy instrument used, namely, which policy instrument adjusts endogenously to accommodate the exogenous changes in …scal policy (see e.g. Leeper et al., 2009, and Leeper, 2010) . Therefore, to understand the logic of our results, we will use one …scal instrument at a time. This means that, along the early costly phase, we allow one of the …scal policy instruments to react to public debt imbalances, so as to stabilize debt around its new target value of 0.6 and, at the same time, it is the same …scal policy instrument that adjusts residually in the long-run to close the government budget. Thus, we assume that the same policy instrument bears the short-term cost of, and reaps the medium-and long-term bene…t from, debt consolidation. In our experiments, the policy rules for these instruments are as in subsection 2.5 above except that now the targetted values are those of the reformed long-run equilibrium. All other …scal policy instruments, except the one used for shock stabilization and debt consolidation, are assumed to remain unchanged over time and equal to their pre-reform status quo values.
In particular, we work as follows. We …rst solve and compare the steady state equilibria with and without debt consolidation. In turn, setting, as initial conditions for the state variables, their long-run values from the solution of the economy without debt consolidation (this is the status quo in subsection 3.2), we compute the equilibrium transition path of each reformed economy under optimized policy rules and in turn compute the associated conditional expected discounted lifetime utility of the household. This is for each method of public …nanc-ing used. The feedback policy coe¢ cients along the transition path are chosen optimally. This is explained in the next subsection.
How we compute optimized feedback policy rules
Irrespectively of the policy experiments studied, to make the comparison of di¤erent policies meaningful, we compute optimized policy rules, so that results do not depend on ad hoc di¤erences in feedback policy coe¢ cients across di¤erent policy rules. The welfare criterion is household's expected discounted lifetime utility, as de…ned in equation (67) in the Appendix.
We work in two steps. In the …rst, preliminary, step, we search for the ranges of feedback policy coe¢ cients, as de…ned in equations (12-16) above, which allow us to get a locally determinate equilibrium (this is what Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007, call implementable rules).
If necessary, these ranges will be further restricted in order to give economically meaningful solutions for the policy instruments; in particular, to give non-negative nominal interest rates, as well as tax rates and public spending ratios between zero and one (see e.g. subsection 5.2 below for numerical results). 6 In our search for determinacy and well-de…ned policy values, we experiment with one, or more, policy instruments and one, or more, operating targets at a time.
In the second step, within the ranges found as explained above, we compute the welfare- In particular, we …rst compute a second-order accurate approximation of conditional welfare, and the associated decentralized equilbrium, as functions of feedback policy coe¢ cients by using the perturbation method of Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004) and, in turn, we use a matlab function (fminsearch.m) to compute the values of the feedback policy coe¢ cients that maximize the second-order accurate approximation of conditional welfare (our matlab routines are available upon request). In this exercise, as said above, the feedback policy coe¢ cients are restricted to be within some prespeci…ed ranges delivering determinacy as well as meaningful values for the policy instruments. We work in this way both without, and with, debt consolidation.
Main results
This section presents the main numerical solutions. We start by presenting the steady state solution of the reformed economy with debt consolidation.
Steady state utility and output with debt consolidation
The new reformed steady state with debt consolidation is as de…ned in subsection 4.3 above.
In other words, thanks to the …scal space created by debt reduction, public spending can rise, or a tax rate can be reduced, residually. Table 3 reports steady-state utility and output under alternative public …nancing cases in the reformed economy. For instance, in the …rst row of Table 3 , the assumption is that it is public spending that takes advantage of debt reduction, in the sense that, once the debt burden has been reduced, public spending can increase relative to its value in the status quo solution. In the other rows, the …scal space is used to …nance cuts in one of the three tax rates. Table 3 reveals that the highest utility and output are achieved when the …scal space is used to …nance a cut in capital tax rates (this is further discussed below). 
Ranges of feedback policy coe¢ cients
Moving to transition, we …rst check for local determinacy. As is well known, the latter may , measuring respectively the reaction of interest rate policy and …scal policy to the output gap, are not found to be critical to determinacy. 8 Nevertheless, as said in subsection 4.4 above, the feedback …scal policy coe¢ cients on public debt, q l , where q (g; c; k; n), may need to be further restricted in order to get meaningful solutions for the …scal instruments used, i.e. in order to get 0 s g t ; c t ; k t ; n t < 1. In particular, our computations imply that we need to work within the ranges k l 2 (0:017; 0:15) for the capital tax rate and c l 2 (0:0345; 0:2) for the consumption tax rate, which are narrower than those required for determinacy only. This makes sense. When debt consolidation is among the policy aims, the …scal authorities may …nd it optimal to increase tax rates, and/or reduce public spending, beyond meaningful or historical ranges. Our simulations imply that this applies in particular to the capital tax rate, k t , which, if it is left free, it can easily rise above 100% in the short run due to the high value of k l chosen (this is consistent with the Ramsey-Chamley result that, since capital is inelastic in the very short, the …scal authorities may …nd it optimal to con…scate it). To avoid such problems, we restrict ourselves within the above ranges for k l and c l . Similarly, since in some experiments monetary policy may …nd it optimal to increase the feedback policy coe¢ cient on in ‡ation, ; to very high values, we restrict its value within the range 1:1 < 3 (see e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007, for a similar upper boundary). Within this range, the resulting equilibrium nominal interest rate is above the zero lower bound in all solutions reported below and this happens irrespectively of the …scal policy instrument used jointly with interest rate policy. It is worth reporting that our main results regarding the welfare ranking of policy instruments do not depend on those policy restrictions (results are available upon request). Also, note that such practice (namely, imposing restrictions on policy instruments) is usual both in the policy literature (see e.g. Cantore et al., 2012), as well as in the theoretical literature on optimal taxation (see e.g. 7 Actually, we can distinguish two regions of determinacy. In addition to the one discussed above, there is another region in which …scal policy does not react to public liabilities, i.e. q l = 0 for all …scal instruments, while monetary policy reacts to in ‡ation mildly with 1:1. This region is welfare inferior to the region discussed above. It also contains some sub-areas where determinacy breaks down. Several other papers on the …scal theory of the price level have distinguished betwen the same two areas of determinacy (e.g. Leeper, 1991 , and Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe, 2007). 8 On the other hand, if we had included a tax on income from government bonds, we would have had to assume a narrower, more restrictive, range of feedback monetary policy reaction to in ‡ation. For instance, if the tax rate is 0.2, monetary policy can guarantee determinacy when the nominal interest rate reacts to in ‡ation with > 1:29 when …scal policy uses government spending or consumption taxes to react to debt, with > 1:43 when …scal policy uses capital taxes to react to debt and with > 1:57 when …scal policy uses labour taxes to react to debt. As the tax rate on income from government bonds increases, the critical minimum value of required for determinacy also increases (results are available upon request). This is similar qualitatively to the results in Edge and Rudd (2007). Chamley, 1986 ).
Thus, the general message is that monetary and …scal policy need to interact with each other in a speci…c way for policy to guarantee determinacy or, as Leeper (2010) puts it, there is a "dirty little secret": for monetary policy to control in ‡ation, …scal policy must behave in a particular manner. Benhabib et al. (2001) have also shown that the …scal-monetary regime a¤ects determinacy.
Optimized policy rules and welfare with debt consolidation
Within the above speci…ed ranges for the feedback policy coe¢ cients, we now compute optimized policy rules. Recall, as explained in subsection 4.1 above, that there are two sources of transition dynamics in this economy: temporary TFP shocks (whose moments were de…ned in subsection 3.1) and debt consolidation reforms (as de…ned in subsection 4.3).
Results for the case with debt consolidation are reported in Table 4 . The …rst colunm lists the pair of policy instruments used (one monetary and one …scal), the second column reports the optimal reaction of the interest rate to in ‡ation and output, and the third column reports the optimal reaction of each …scal policy instrument to debt and output. Expected discounted lifetime utility, E 0 V 0 , is reported in the last column.
There are three messages from Table 4 . First, regarding monetary policy, the interest rate should react aggressively to in ‡ation, while, reaction to the output gap is negligible. The idea behind the very small value of y is that stabilization of output around its steady state value is accompanied by increased volatility in in ‡ation and nominal interest rates and this is not desirable. 9 The optimal reaction to the output gap, from the point of view of monetary authorities, is revisited in Section 7 below. Second, regarding …scal policy, when we use public spending, or consumption taxes, or capital taxes, …scal reaction to the output gap is smaller in magnitude than …scal reaction to public debt. This means that public spending should fall, while consumption taxes and capital taxes should rise, to address the public debt problem. By contrast, when we use labor taxes, reaction to ouput is clearly stronger than reaction to debt. This means that the labor tax rate should be reduced at impact to help the real economy. In other words, a particularly distorting policy instrument, like labor taxes, should be used to address output imbalances rather than to reduce the debt burden. All this is con…rmed by the impulse response functions shown below. Third, when we rank policy instruments according to 9 This is as in e.g. Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2007). The desirability of not responding to the output gap, at least when the output target is the steady state value of output, is con…rmed when we keep at its optimal value and arbitrarily increase y ; then, the volatility of both in ‡ation and output rises. The same happens when we arbitrarily increase y and decrease .
expected discounted lifetime utility, E 0 V 0 , the best possible mix is R t and s g t . Notice that, to the extent that feedback policy coe¢ cients are chosen optimally, welfare di¤erences, at least in terms of lifetime utility, across di¤erent policy mixes are very small. 10 Keep in mind however that this welfare ranking is in terms of lifetime utility only; shorter time horizons may imply di¤erent things (see below). 
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The optimized policy rules shape the motion of public debt over time. Figure 1 shows the resulting path of the public debt-to-GDP ratio. The duration of the debt consolidation phase, or equivalently the speed of debt reduction, depends heavily on the …scal policy instrument used. In particular, more than 95% of debt consolidation should be achieved within 20 time periods (5 years), if we use the public spending ratio, s g t ; within 20 time periods (5 years), if we use the consumption tax rate, c t ; and within 50 time periods (12.5 years), if we use the capital tax rate, k t . On the other hand, if we use the labor tax rate, n t , the debt-to-output ratio should converge very slowly to its 60% target looking like a unit-root process. The general idea is that the more distorting the policy instrument is, the slower the debt adjustment should be.
1 0 When we express welfare di¤erences using consumption equivalents, as in e.g. Lucas (1990) , the results are the same. In particular, in Table 4 , when the reference regime is Rt and s g t ;the welfare losses expressed in consumption equivalents are -0.0012 when we use consumption taxes, -0.0013 when we use capital taxes and -0.0035 when we use labour taxes. 
Welfare over various time horizons with and without debt consolidation
We now study what happens to welfare over various time horizons. This is important because, for several (political-economy) reasons, economic agents'behavior can be short sighted. Setting the feedback policy coe¢ cients as in Table 4 above, the expected discounted utility at various time horizons is reported in Table 5 . In the same Table, we also report results without debt consolidation other things equal (these are the numbers in parentheses). As said in subsection 4.1, without debt consolidation, we again compute optimized policy rules but now the economy starts from, and returns to, the status quo solution.
There are two messages from Table 5 . First, when we focus on lifetime utility, welfare di¤erences between debt consolidation and no debt consolidation look to be small. 11 But, a more careful inspection of the results in Table 5 reveals that this happens only because shortterm e¤ects work in opposite direction from medium-and long-term e¤ects, so that the net, or lifetime, e¤ects are small. In particular, the comparison of outcomes with consolidation to outcomes without consolidation implies that, in most cases, consolidation is costly in the short run and that these costs are not trivial. 12 By contrast, after the …rst 60 periods or 15 years, debt 1 1 When expressed in consumption equivalents, the welfare gains of debt consolidation are 0.0036 when we use government spending, 0.0025 when we use consumption taxes, 0.0024 when we use capital taxes and 0.00024 when we use labor taxes. In each case, the reference regime is the case without debt consolidation. 1 2 The exception is when we use the capital tax rate in which case debt consolidation is clearly superior even in the short term. This is consistent with the Chamley-Judd result. Namely, in the very short run, capital taxes act as a capital levy on predetermined wealth so that the best …scal policy is to bring public debt down by higher capital taxes. Recall that here policy is conducted by rules.
consolidation becomes superior across all cases and this more than o¤sets its short-term costs, so that, eventually, the lifetime, or net, utility becomes higher with debt consolidation. Second, without debt consolidation, and to the extent that feedback policy coe¢ cients are optimally chosen, the choice of the …scal policy instrument used is trivial. Welfare di¤erences appear after the second decimal point across all time horizons (these are the numbers in parentheses).
On the other hand, with debt consolidation, the choice of the policy instrument matters more (these are the numbers without parentheses). Now, except from the case in which we care only about the short run, the best policy mix is R t s g t . In the short run, by contrast, the best mix is R t k t for the reasons explained above. 
Adding labor market rigidities
The previous analysis has assumed away any rigidities in the labor market. This is questionable since it is widely believed that labor market rigidities are a key feature of the European economy (see e.g. Blanchard, 2004) . In this subsection, we extend the model to allow for such rigidities.
To avoid further complicating the model, but to also help it replicate the stylized facts in Europe regarding inertia in wage adjustment, we follow the setup employed in Blanchard and Galí (2007), Malley et al. (2009) and many others. In particular, we start by assuming that the nominal wage rate at time t is a weighted average of the nominal wage in the previous period, t 1, and the nominal wage that would arise in case the labor market worked perfectly.
In turn, expressing variables in real terms, the real wage rate follows the rule:
where 0 1 measures the degree of wage sluggishness and M RS t n (1+ c t )n i;t (1 n t )c i;t (see equation (30) 
Results with labor market rigidities
The model is resolved using the new speci…cation in the labor market. Regarding ranges of feedback policy coe¢ cients graranteeing determinacy and meaningful solutions for the policy instruments, we report that these ranges practically remain as in subsection 5.2 above, except that now, when we use capital and labor taxes on the side of …scal policy, the minimum boundaries of interest rate reaction to in ‡ation are related to the minimum boundaries of …scal policy reaction to public debt (namely, if we allow the …scal reaction to debt to rise, the monetary reaction to in ‡ation needs also to rise to guarantee determinacy).
Within these ranges, the new results are reported in Tables 6 and 7, which are like Tables 4   and 5 respectively. There are three messages. First, optimal …scal reaction to the output gap is now much bigger than in the case without labor market rigidities. That is, now the …scal authorities …nd it optimal to also react to the recession so that debt reduction is not their only concern. Actually, in the case of public spending, capital taxes and labor taxes, the coe¢ cient on the output gap is bigger than the coe¢ cient on the debt gap; this means that now public spending should rise, and capital and labor taxes should fall, in order to stimulate the economy, and only in turn be used to address the debt problem. Second, when there are rigidities in the labor market, it is better to use income tax rates along with the interest rate. That is, under debt consolidation, the mixes R t k t and R t n t score better than R t s g t and this is the case both in the very short run and in the long run. Intuitively, this follows naturally from the …rst result above: since the emphasis should be now given to the real economy, it is better to use …scal instruments, like income taxes, which can more more e¤ectively stimulate the economy and which are relatively close to the heart of the labor market imperfection. Third, monetary reaction to the output gap remains very small, as it was also the case in Table 4 . The resulting public debt dynamics are shown in Figure 2 . The general message is that it is optimal to reduce public debt more gradually than in Figure 1 . In particular, when we use public spending or consumption taxes, debt adjustment should take place at a slower pace during the …rst 5-10 periods or quarters. But the di¤erence from Figure 1 becomes more striking when we use capital and labour income taxes. Now, it is clearly optimal to let the debt-to-output ratio further rise in the very short run, so as to help the real economy recover …rst, and only then decrease the debt gradually by following an almost unit root process to its 60% target. 
Impulse responce functions of optimized …scal instruments with and withour labor rigidities
To make our results clearer, we also provide the impulse response functions of the optimized …scal policy instruments studied above. This is shown in Figure 3 . In this Figure As can be seen in Figure 3 , consumption tax rates should rise, with or without wage rigidities. Public spending should clearly fall without wage rigidities, while this fall should be milder in the presence of wage rigidities (actually, recall from the values of feedback policy coe¢ cients in Table 6 , which were based on second-order approximations, that public spending should rise at impact in the presence of wage rigidities). The degree of wage rigidities also plays an important role when we use income taxes. If there are no such rigidities, capital tax rates should rise to bring public debt down. But, if there are wage rigidities, the change in capital taxes should be very mild to help the real economy recover …rst. The policy emphasis on the real activity becomes even more obvious when we use labor taxes which are particularly distorting. Now, labor tax rates should be cut so as to counter the recession and only later on they should be raised to address the debt problem; naturally, this gets more obvious in the presence of labor rigidities. 
Robustness
We …nally conduct a sensitivity analysis. For instance, we check robustness to changes in parameter values; to di¤erent initial values for the state variables like public debt; to assuming a more volatile economy; and to two generalizations of the model that allow for policy reaction to the natural level of output and for trend in ‡ation.
The bottom line will be that the main results (e.g. the welfare ranking of …scal policy instruments, the comparison between debt consolidation and non debt consolidation, and how monetary and …scal policy instruments should react to economic indicators) remain una¤ected. Results are available upon request.
Alternative parameterizations of the model

Di¤erent initial values of public debt
Our results are robust to changes in the initial value of public debt. Recall that so far the starting value of public debt as share of output has been 85% which was the average annual value over 2008-2011 in the data. Our results are not a¤ected if instead we start with, say, 88% (data value in 2011) or 93% (data value in 2012).
Results are again available upon request.
Allowing for a more volatile economy
Our results are robust to assuming a more volatile economy. This can be captured by a higher standard deviation of the existing TFP shock (for instance, an arbitrary increase in standard deviation from 0.017, which has been its value so far, to 0.034), or by adding new shocks, like policy shocks in the feedback rules (12)- (16) as well as shocks to the time preference rate. 14 It is worth pointing out however that, when extrinsic volatiliy rises (meaning a higher standard deviation and/or more sources of stochasticity), we need, in most cases, to further restrict the range of feedback policy coe¢ cients in order to guarantee determinacy and well-de…ned values for the policy instruments employed for cyclical stabilization and debt consolidation.
Again, results are available upon request.
Policy reaction to the natural level of output
We now assume that, in each time period, policymakers react to the current natural level of output rather than to its steady state level. The natural level of output is de…ned as the level of output that would arise in the absence of nominal …xities. Technically, this means that the policy target for output in the feedback policy rules, (12)- (16), is now time-varying and its value follows from the …ctional case in which, other things equal, the Calvo parameter is set at zero. Thus, we …rst solve for this …ctional case (always computing welfare-maximizing 1 3 Actually, most results remain unchanged even within the wider range 0:005 m 0:1. Note however that very low values of m ; like 0:005, result in values for real money balances as share of output that are too low relative to the data (as said in subsection 3.1, the data average annual value is around 0.5). Thus, the range 0:01 m 0:1 gives values close to the data. 1 4 We model shocks to the time preference rate by using an AR(1) process like that in equation (18) The new results, when policymakers react to the natural level of output, are reported in Table A .1 in Appendix 5, which is like Table 4 in the main text (since nominal …xities play no real role in the long run, the steady state solution remains the same as in Table 2 ). Comparison of these Tables implies that the main results do not change. On the other hand, there are some interesting quantitative di¤erences. For instance, optimal interest rate reaction to the output gap, as measured by y , is much stronger in Table A .1 than it was in Table 4 . This makes sense: while monetary policy should not respond to the output gap when the output target in the gap is its steady state level, reaction to this gap becomes more desirable when the output target accounts for the distortions in output caused by, for instance, nominal …xities (see also e.g. Kirsanova et al., 2009, and Sims, 2013 , for which measure of output should be targeted by the central bank in interest rate rules). 15 Thus, although the feedback policy coe¢ cient on in ‡ation, , is still higher than the coe¢ cient on output, y , response to output is welfare enhancing relative to Table 4 , where the interest rate responded solely to in ‡ation. To put it di¤erently, although in ‡ation remains the main concern of monetary authorities, it is not the sole concern.
Allowing for trend in ‡ation
We now allow for trend or steady state in ‡ation. For instance, we allow the gross steady state rate of in ‡ation, , to be 1.005 quarterly (or 1.02 annually) which is perceived to be the target Table A .2 with positive trend in ‡ation than in Table 2 with zero trend in ‡ation. Expected discounted lifetime utility is also lower with positive trend in ‡ation irrespectively of the …scal policy instrument used (compare Table A.3 to Table 4 ). Nevertheless, the main qualitative results do not change. For instance, 1 5 It is useful to report the following experiment. We exogenously set = 1:5 and y = 0:35 which are typical numbers in a Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate. Then, our computations, with such ad hoc policy coe¢ cients, show that the standard deviation of both in ‡ation and output are lower when the output target in the output gap measure is the current-period natural level of output than when the output target is its time-invariant steady state level. public spending is again the least distorting …scal policy instrument, and labor taxes the most distorting one, as it was the case in Table 4 .
Concluding remarks and possible extensions
This paper studied the optimal mix of monetary and …scal policy actions in a New Keynesian model of a closed economy. The aim was to welfare rank di¤erent …scal (tax and spending) policy instruments when, at the same time, the central bank followed a Taylor rule for the nominal interest rate. We did so when the policy task was to stabilize the economy against shocks and to reduce public debt over time. This type of work can be further extended in several ways. For instance, it would be interesting to study the implications of less conventional monetary policy instruments, like the case in which the central bank acts as a lender of last resort. Similarly, it would be interesting to use a more detailed decomposition of public spending (like spending on infrastructure, education services, social security, etc) and reexamine the attractiveness of each one of those spending categories as a tool for macroeconomic stabilization (but this would require a richer model where each public spending category functions a well-speci…ed role). Finally, one could allow for a di¤erent policy reaction to economic fundamentals during booms and during recessions (although, as far as we know, policy regime switching is a challenging task computationally; see e.g. Foerster et al., 2014) . We leave these extensions for future work. 
Household i's consumption bundle at t, c i;t , is a composite of h = 1; 2; :::; N varieties of goods, denoted as c i;t (h), where each variety h is produced monopolistically by one …rm h.
Using the Dixit-Stiglitz aggregator, we de…ne:
= 1 are weights (to avoid scale e¤ects, we set = 1=N ).
Household i's total consumption expenditure is:
Household' s optimality conditions
Each household i acts competitively taking prices and policy as given. Following the related literature, we …rst suppose that the household chooses its desired consumption of the composite good, c i;t , and, in turn, chooses how to distribute its purchases of individual varieties, c i;t (h).
The …rst-order conditions include the budget constraint above and:
Equations (27) and (28) are respectively the Euler equations for capital and bonds, (29) is the optimality condition for money balances, (30) is the optimality condition for work hours and (31) shows the optimal demand for each variety of goods.
Notice that equations (26) and (31) imply for the price index:
Appendix 2: Firms
This Appendix provides details and the solution of …rm's problem. There are h = 1; 2; :::; N …rms. Each …rm h produces a di¤erentiated good of variety h under monopolistic competition facing Calvo-type nominal …xities.
Demand for …rm' s product
Each …rm h faces demand for its product, y t (h). The latter comes from households'consumption and investment, c t (h) and x t (h), where c t (h) P N i=1 c i;t (h) and x t (h) P N i=1 x i;t (h); and from the government, g t (h). Thus,
where we have from above:
and similarly:
where c t P N i=1 c i;t it total private consumption, x t P N i=1 x i;t is total private investment and g t is total public spending. Since, at the economy level:
the above equations imply that the demand for each …rm's product is:
Firm' s problem
Nominal pro…t of each …rm h is:
where A t is an exogenous stochastic TFP process.
Under imperfect competition, pro…t maximization is subject to the demand function derived above, namely:
In addition, following Calvo (1983), …rms choose their prices facing a nominal …xity. In each period, …rm h faces an exogenous probability of not being able to reset its price. A …rm h, which is able to reset its price, chooses its price P # t (h) to maximize the sum of discounted expected nominal pro…ts for the next k periods in which it may have to keep its price …xed.
Firm' s optimality conditions
Following the related literature, we follow a two-step procedure. We …rst solve a cost minimization problem, where each …rm h minimizes its cost by choosing factor inputs given technology and prices. The solution will give a minimum nominal cost function, which is a function of factor prices and output produced by the …rm. In turn, given this cost function, each …rm, which is able to reset its price, solves a maximization problem by choosing its price.
The solution to the cost minimization problem gives the input demand functions:
where mc t = 0 t (:) is the marginal nominal cost with t (:) denoting the associated minimum nominal cost function for producing y t (h) at t.
Then, the …rm chooses its price, P # t (h), to maximize nominal pro…ts:
o where t;t+k is a discount factor taken as given by the …rm and where y t+k (h) =
The …rst-order condition gives:
Dividing by the aggregate price index, P t , we have:
Thus, the behaviour of …rm h, which can reset its price, is summarized by (42) , (43) and (45) .
Each …rm h, which can reset its price in period t, solves an identical problem, so P # t (h) = P # t is independent of h; and each …rm h, which cannot reset its price, just sets its previous period price P t (h) = P t 1 (h) : Then, it can be shown that the evolution of the aggregate price level is given by:
9.3 Appendix 3: Decentralized equilibrium (given policy instruments)
We now combine the above to solve for a Decentralized Equilibrium (DE) for any feasible monetary and …scal policy. In this DE, (i) all households maximize utility (ii) a fraction 
Using these two auxiliary variables, z 1 t and z 2 t , we come up with two new equations which enter the dynamic system and allow a recursive representation of (61). Thus, we replace equation
Appendix 5: The natural level of output as a policy target
In this Appendix, the policy target for output, in each period, is the level without nominal …xities. Then, working as explained in the text (see Section 7), Table 4 9.6 Appendix 6: Allowing for steady-state in ‡ation
In this section, we allow for steady state, or trend, in ‡ation (2% annually). Then, working as explained in the text (see Section 7), Table 2 changes to: 
